Lewis Rao 2015 - Unfavorable Economics of Ad Measurement - Overview

Summary

Lewis & Rao (QJE 2015; earlier circulated as “On the Near Impossibility of Measuring the Returns to Advertising”) use 25 randomized display-ad experiments run on Yahoo! between 2007 and 2011 (19 retail campaigns, 6 financial-services campaigns, $2.8M of spend) to show that even perfectly randomized, million-user experiments measure advertising ROI imprecisely. Individual sales have a standard-deviation-to-mean ratio near 10 (about 30 for account sign-ups), so a profitable campaign explains an of about of sales variance. The median retail ROI standard error is 26% (CI over 100 points wide); the median campaign would need to be 9 times larger to separate 0% from +50% ROI and 62 times larger (retail) to separate 0% from +10%. The same arithmetic implies that observational estimators face selection biases many times the causal effect.

Overview

Research question and contribution

Question. Does advertising move purchases by as much as prices and margins imply, and can an individual advertiser even find out? US firms spend roughly $500 per person per year on ads (the paper cites Coen 2008 and Kantar Media 2012 for this figure). At typical margins that requires a causal effect of $1,500-2,200 in annual sales per person ($3,500-5,500 per household) to break even (§I, p. 1941). The authors frame this as an old open question, citing Abraham & Lodish (1990): does advertising change purchasing as much as prevailing ad prices and firms’ gross margins imply? Digital media, where exposure and purchases can be measured and randomized for each person, suggested that RCTs would finally settle it. The paper’s answer is that RCTs are real progress but even very large ones measure returns imprecisely (pp. 1941-1942).

Main Content

Positive thesis and the “strong claim” (Abstract, §I)

The paper is pessimistic about precision but not about experiments. Two sentences fix its stance:

  • RCTs are progress anyway (Abstract, p. 1941). “Despite these unfavorable economics, randomized control trials represent progress by injecting new, unbiased information into the market.” The abstract adds that the inference problems the field experiments expose also show that selection bias, which comes from the targeted nature of advertising, is “a crippling concern for widely employed observational methods”. So the RCT is noisy but unbiased, while the observational alternative is precise-looking but biased. The paper’s case for experiments rests on that contrast; see Lewis Rao 2015 - Market Implications, Persuasion Games and Conclusion for how §V develops it.
  • The strong claim (§I, p. 1944). The authors call their headline “the admittedly strong claim that most advertisers do not, and indeed some cannot, know the effectiveness of their advertising spend”. Because the claim is strong, they say it is “paramount to further substantiate our data and methods” and give four supports. (1) The retail and financial firms are representative of the firms that make up most ad spending in revenue base, margins and product types. (2) Holding spend fixed, a longer evaluation window would typically not improve power. (3) They used all available data, such as pre-campaign sales, to control for chance treatment-control differences. (4) The experiment-size multipliers calibrate the financial commitment needed for truly informative RCTs, so readers can judge whether the findings apply to a given firm or market segment (pp. 1944-1945). The four supports are worked out in Lewis Rao 2015 - Table I Summary of the 25 Yahoo Display Experiments, Lewis Rao 2015 - Table II Estimation Protocol, Windows and ROI Standard Errors and Lewis Rao 2015 - Table III Power and Experiment Size Multipliers.

Read together, “do not” is an empirical statement about current practice. “Some cannot” is the impossibility claim: for small advertisers, and for low per-person spend, no affordable experiment reaches informative precision (§IV.B; Lewis Rao 2015 - Robustness, Scale, Targeting and Measurement Technology).

Publication details (front matter)

ItemDetailLocation
Authors and affiliationsRandall A. Lewis (Google) and Justin M. Rao (Microsoft Research)title p. 1941; affiliations p. 1971
Former employerThe authors thank engineers, sales people and product managers at Yahoo!, Inc., “our former employer”. All 25 experiments ran on Yahoo!title footnote *, p. 1941
AcknowledgementsSpecial thanks to David Reiley “for his contributions to this work”. Feedback from Ned Augenblick, Arun Chandrasekhar, Sharad Goel, Garrett Johnson, Clara Lewis, R. Preston McAfee, Markus Möbius, Lars Lefgren, Michael Schwarz and Ken Wilburtitle footnote *, p. 1941
Disclaimer”The work represents our views alone.”title footnote *, p. 1941
Earlier titleCirculated as “On the Near Impossibility of Measuring the Returns to Advertising”title footnote *, p. 1941
JEL codesL10 (market structure, firm strategy and performance: general), M37 (advertising), C93 (field experiments)end of abstract, p. 1941
CitationQuarterly Journal of Economics 130(4) (2015), 1941-1973, doi:10.1093/qje/qjv023; Advance Access July 6, 2015p. 1941
SupplementOnline Appendix at QJE online (not included in the raw PDF)p. 1971

Contribution.

  1. A minimal decision model of campaign evaluation (cost per user , concave sales response , margin ) and a closed-form link between the impact-to-standard-deviation ratio, and the -statistic (§II). → Lewis Rao 2015 - The Advertiser’s Problem and Marginal ROI, Lewis Rao 2015 - Impact-to-SD Ratio Derivation and Calibrated Campaign
  2. Unusually rich data: individual-level online + in-store sales and firm-supplied gross margins for 25 RCTs (§III.A, Table I). → Lewis Rao 2015 - Table I Summary of the 25 Yahoo Display Experiments
  3. Realized precision of each experiment and the levers that did/did not help (evaluation windows, covariates, filtering, binarization; Table II, Figure II). → Lewis Rao 2015 - Table II Estimation Protocol, Windows and ROI Standard Errors
  4. “Experiment multipliers”: how many times larger each RCT must be for adequate power under four increasingly demanding hypothesis pairs (Table III). → Lewis Rao 2015 - Table III Power and Experiment Size Multipliers
  5. Robustness to other categories and media, scale, targeting/concentration, technology trends (§IV) and market-level implications including strategic misreporting inside the firm (§V). → Lewis Rao 2015 - Robustness, Scale, Targeting and Measurement Technology, Lewis Rao 2015 - Market Implications, Persuasion Games and Conclusion

Key findings (numbers)

QuantityValueLocation
Experiments / spend25 (19 retail, 6 brokerage) / $2.8MAbstract, §I
Cost per exposed user$0.02-0.39 (text: $0.02-0.35 in §I), most close to $0.10§I p. 1942, Table II col. 8
Media equivalent of that spend20-60 “premium” display ads, or about 7-10 prime-time TV commercials, per exposed user (fn. 1: online prices are more spread out because targeting is finer, so exposures per dollar vary more)§I p. 1942
Sample needed to tell 100% ROI apart from ROI > 0%“single-digit millions of person-weeks” at typical digital ad intensity§I p. 1942
Size of an informative experiment”can easily require more than 10 million person-weeks”Abstract p. 1941
Size of the experiments actually runeach > 500,000 unique users; most > 1,000,000§I p. 1943
Sales s.d./mean (retail)median 9.9, range 3.1-22.6Table I col. 10
Sign-up s.d./mean (brokerage)median 29.8, all > 24Table I Panel B
of a +25% ROI campaign0.0000054eq. (8)
Median s.e. of ROIretail 26.1% (mean 61.8%); brokerage 115%Table II col. 10
Experiments with for “did ads do anything?“10 of 25Table III
Experiments with for 0% vs +50%3 of 25Table III
Median multiplier, 0% vs +10% ROIretail 62 (text says 61), brokerage 1,241Table III
Median multiplier, 0% vs +5% ROIretail 247, brokerage 4,964Table III
Selection-to-causal ratio in a simple targeting exampleabout 30fn. 5

Person-weeks as the unit of sample size

The paper counts sample size in person-weeks: one person observed for one week of a campaign. The abstract’s “more than 10 million person-weeks” and §I’s “single-digit millions of person-weeks” both refer to this unit. The multipliers in Table III assume the advertiser can add new, independent person-weeks (§I p. 1943). Adding weeks is only as good as adding people when purchases are independent across weeks; see Lewis Rao 2015 - Table III Power and Experiment Size Multipliers.

Source Map

Every section, equation, table, figure and substantive footnote of the paper, with the note that captures it.

Source partContentNote
Abstract, §I Introduction (pp. 1941-1946)Motivation, $500/person, 25 RCTs, CV of 10, 26%/115% ROI s.e., 9x and 62x multipliers, of 0.0000054, selection 30x, caveats, four implications; positive thesis (“injecting new, unbiased information”) and the “admittedly strong claim” with its four supports (see Positive thesis section)this note; Lewis Rao 2015 - Impact-to-SD Ratio Derivation and Calibrated Campaign; Lewis Rao 2015 - Market Implications, Persuasion Games and Conclusion
Front matter: title footnote * (earlier title, Reiley acknowledgement, former Yahoo! employees, views alone), JEL codes, affiliations (p. 1971)this note, Publication details
fn. 1 (price spread of online ads), fn. 2 (intermediate metrics such as clicks)Lewis Rao 2015 - Impact-to-SD Ratio Derivation and Calibrated Campaign (fn. 1 in the cost-of-display paragraph; fn. 2 under “Intermediate metrics”); fn. 1’s media equivalence also in this note’s Key findings
fn. 3 (higher dose vs diminishing returns)Lewis Rao 2015 - Robustness, Scale, Targeting and Measurement Technology
fn. 4 ( arithmetic), fn. 5 (selection effect 30x), fn. 6 (TV digitization, geo tests are ITT)Lewis Rao 2015 - Impact-to-SD Ratio Derivation and Calibrated Campaign; Lewis Rao 2015 - Robustness, Scale, Targeting and Measurement Technology
§II.A Definitions and Model; Figure I (The Advertiser’s Problem); fn. 7 (concavity)campaign, , , , ROI, , , regionsLewis Rao 2015 - The Advertiser’s Problem and Marginal ROI
§II.B Calibrating the Model; eqs. (1)-(8); fns. 8-12cost of display, three components of sales volatility, estimator, and derivations, representative campaign, power at 2M and 200k users, observational-bias implication, comScore 300% exampleLewis Rao 2015 - Impact-to-SD Ratio Derivation and Calibrated Campaign
§III preamblewhy point estimates are not reportedLewis Rao 2015 - Table I Summary of the 25 Yahoo Display Experiments
§III.A Overview and Data; Table I (incl. table notes a and b); fns. 13-1425 campaigns, assignment vs exposure counts as unique user identifiers, PSA (charity) controls, sales momentsLewis Rao 2015 - Table I Summary of the 25 Yahoo Display Experiments
§III.B Estimating Returns; Table II; Figure II; fns. 15-16window proposition, covariates, binarization trade-off, ROI s.e., dose-precision curve (Figure II markers checked against Table II; retailer-3 row 3.7 not plotted)Lewis Rao 2015 - Table II Estimation Protocol, Windows and ROI Standard Errors
§III.C Power and Experiment Counterfactuals; Table III; fns. 17-20, multipliers, counts per hypothesis set (text-vs-table count discrepancies flagged for the 50- and 10-point tests), 676x annualization, drug-portfolio and consulting analogiesLewis Rao 2015 - Table III Power and Experiment Size Multipliers
§III.D Optimizing Expenditure with an ROI Target; fns. 21-23marginal profit, Var of marginal ROI, creative comparisonsLewis Rao 2015 - The Advertiser’s Problem and Marginal ROI
§IV.A Sales Volatility; fn. 24autos 20:1, where results do not applyLewis Rao 2015 - Robustness, Scale, Targeting and Measurement Technology
§IV.B Scale; fns. 25-26; Online Appendix “Super Bowl Impossibility Theorem”tens of millions of dollars; evolving priors; eBay paid search; “even this sort of commitment would not be enough” caveatLewis Rao 2015 - Robustness, Scale, Targeting and Measurement Technology
§IV.C Audience and Expenditure Intensitytop- targeting condition, concentrated testsLewis Rao 2015 - Robustness, Scale, Targeting and Measurement Technology
§IV.D Advances in Data Collection and Methodsexperimentation-as-a-service, free control groups, addressable TVLewis Rao 2015 - Robustness, Scale, Targeting and Measurement Technology
§V Discussion and Conclusion; fns. 27-28; Online Appendix Table IIweak selective pressure, persuasion game (Shin 1994), scale economies for publishers, vitamin E RCT, “quantitative veneer”Lewis Rao 2015 - Market Implications, Persuasion Games and Conclusion
References (pp. 1972-1973; 31 works); fn. 18 field-experiment examplesfull catalogue with where each work is citedLewis Rao 2015 - Reference List and Cited Literature
Online Appendix (not in the raw PDF)Super Bowl theorem, targeting derivation, cross-firm ad spend tabledescribed from the main text only

Earlier synthesis of this paper together with Lewis-Rao-Reiley (2013/2015), Johnson-Lewis-Reiley (2017) and Gordon-Moakler-Zettelmeyer (2023): The Unfavorable Economics of Ad Experiments - Power and Signal-to-Noise.

Examples

Example: What the paper's opening numbers imply about margins

US firms spend about $500 per person per year on advertising, and the paper says breaking even requires causally moving $1,500-2,200 of annual sales per person (p. 1941). Those two numbers together imply gross margins of about to , in line with the 15-50% retail margins in Table II. Spread across the many campaigns a person sees in a year, each one’s share of that required effect is small relative to person-level sales noise (s.d. about ten times the mean), which is why each campaign’s is tiny. (My inference from the stated figures; the paper does not state the implied margin.)

Connections

See Also