Blake 2015 - Working Paper vs Econometrica Version Differences

Summary

The vault’s notes are built on NBER Working Paper 20171 (May 2014). The paper was published as Econometrica 83(1):155-174 (January 2015). This note maps the working paper onto the published version, using the authors’ accepted manuscript (12 August 2014) and the journal’s published online supplement. Every estimate is unchanged: 99.5% retention, Table 2/3 coefficients, ROI −63% [−124%, −3%], −80% in levels, and Germany Table 5. The published version is a compressed re-organisation. The SEM overview is folded into the introduction, the ROI table becomes Table 1, the brand and DiD regression tables and the product-category analysis move to an online appendix (Tables A.I-A.VI), and several Discussion passages are cut, including the Google AdWords ROI quote and the user-level-randomization paragraph. Two items are added: a frequency-slope estimate and the 95% CI of the DiD effect. Cite the published version for its numbers, and the WP for the passages that were cut.

Overview

Why this matters. Anyone citing “Table 2” or “eq. (5)” from these notes against the journal article will find different numbers on the labels. Some passages quoted in the vault (the AdWords advice, the Lewis et al. 2011 5.4% vs 871-1,198% comparison, the CLV remark) exist only in the working paper.

What was checked. The accepted manuscript (“Forthcoming in Econometrica”, 12 August 2014) and the published supplement were text-extracted and compared section by section with the WP. The final typeset article could differ from the accepted manuscript in copy-editing, so treat statements about the main text as “as of the accepted manuscript”. Statements about the appendix come from the published supplement.

Main Content

Front matter

ItemNBER WP 20171Econometrica (accepted ms. / published)
DateMay 2014Accepted ms. 12 Aug 2014; published Jan 2015, Vol. 83 No. 1, 155-174
First authorTom BlakeThomas Blake
AffiliationsBlake: eBay Research Labs. Nosko: Chicago Booth and eBay Research Labs. Tadelis: Haas, UC Berkeley and NBER. Title page: “This work was done while Tadelis and Nosko were employed by ebay Research Labs.”Blake: eBay Research Labs. Nosko: University of Chicago and eBay Research Labs. Tadelis: UC Berkeley, NBER and eBay Research Labs
JELC93, D22, L10, L20, L81, M37(not printed in the accepted ms.)
AcknowledgementsnoneThanks eBay employees and executives, Athey, Lewis, Rao, Reiley, Zettelmeyer, an Editor and three referees
Abstract”Because search clicks and purchase behavior are correlated … conventional non-experimental estimates""Because search clicks and purchase intent are correlated … non-experimental estimates” (otherwise the same)

Structure map

NBER WP 20171Econometrica (accepted ms. + supplement)
§1 Introduction§1 Introduction, which also absorbs the SEM mechanics and Fig. 1 discussion from WP §2
§2 An Overview of Search Engine MarketingMerged into §1. Position-auction material (Edelman et al. 2007, Varian 2007, Athey & Ellison 2011 quote) dropped
§3 Brand Search Experiments, Table 1§2 Brand Search Experiments; the table moves to supplement Table A.I (“Brand Keyword Click Magnitude Estimation”)
§4 / §4.1 Non-brand experiment, eq. (1)-(2), Table 2§3 / §3.1. Eq. (1)-(2) move to the supplement as (A.1)-(A.2); Table 2 → Table A.II
eq. (3)-(4), Table 3Main-text eq. (1)-(2); Table 3 is merged into Table 1 (ROI) cols 1-4
§4.2 Consumer heterogeneity, eq. (5), Fig. 4-5§3.2, eq. (3), Fig. 4-5
§4.3 Product Response HeterogeneityMoved to the supplement (“Product Response Heterogeneity”), with a one-sentence summary in §3.2
§4.4 Where did the Traffic Go?§3.3 “Where did the Non-Brand Traffic Go?”
§5 Deriving ROI, eq. (6), Table 4§4, eq. (4), Table 1 (now also lists DMA/Date FE and N per column)
§6 Discussion§5 Discussion (shortened)
Appendix: Controlled Brand-Keyword Experiments, Fig. 6, Table 5Supplement: Fig. A.1, Table A.III
Appendix: Randomization Procedure DetailSupplement (same text)
Appendix: Candidacy IV, eq. (7)-(8), Table 6Supplement, (A.3)-(A.4), Table A.IV (rows relabelled “ln(Test Period Spend)” / “ln(Pre Period Spend)” instead of “Cost”)
Appendix: Candidacy DiD, Table 7Supplement, Table A.V (identical numbers)
Appendix: ROI Results in Levels, Table 8Supplement, Table A.VI (identical: 0.199, s.e. 0.161)
Appendix: ROI Calculations, eq. (9)-(11)Supplement, (A.5)-(A.7). Still uses for paid search off, with no time interaction (see Blake 2015 - ROI Derivation from Experimental Log-Sales Effects)

Content added in the published version

  • 95% CI for the DiD effect: “the entire regime of paid search adds only 0.66 percent to sales with a 95 percent confidence interval of [-0.42%,1.74%]” (accepted ms. §3.1). The WP gives only the point estimate and s.e.
  • Frequency slope (fn. 19): “Only the zero purchases effect is statistically distinguishable from other segments, even when pooled into larger buckets”. A spline starting at one purchase, with a continuous purchase count replacing , has slope −0.0038 (s.e. 0.0014), drawn as a dashed line on Fig. 4a. This qualifies the WP’s reading of significant m=1-2 effects (Blake 2015 - Consumer and Product Heterogeneity in Paid Search Response).
  • Segment definition: is “Users with no purchases in the prior year” (accepted ms.), against “New registered users” (WP).
  • Table 2 / A.II: adds a “Date Fixed Effects” row, ticked for col (2) only, which clarifies the col (4) specification (Blake 2015 - Non-Brand DMA Geo Experiment and DiD Estimates).
  • Figure notes: each figure and table gets an explanatory caption. The Fig. 3 caption repeats the units: “thousands of dollars per day, per DMA”.
  • New citations: Lodish et al. (1995), on the tradition of controlled TV ad experiments; Lambrecht & Tucker (2013), on retargeting; Narayanan & Kalyanam (2011), on search position effects by regression discontinuity. New footnotes on Rutz & Bucklin (2011), which distinguishes generic from branded terms but does not measure brand-ad efficacy, and Yang & Ghose (2010), which does not measure sales.
  • Incentives sentence: the list of parties whose incentives favour bigger budgets adds “marketing executives within companies”.
  • Kept, for reference: the Yang & Ghose (2010) 90-keyword comparison and the “1.5 percent of all paid clicks” remark (WP fn. 16) survive, and so does the “11 separate regressions” remark (WP fn. 24 → fn. 18).
  • Traffic section: adds “This helps explain why we found that clicks are lost but revenue is not.”

Content dropped from the published version (WP-only)

WP passageLocation in WPVault note holding it
Wanamaker quote§1 p. 1Blake 2015 - SEM Mechanics and the Endogeneity of Click-Priced Spend
Position-auction incentive argument and Athey & Ellison quote (fn. 15)§2 p. 7SEM Mechanics note
Lewis et al. (2011): 5.4% experimental vs 871-1,198% observational (fn. 32)§6 p. 22Blake 2015 - Discussion, Limitations and Lessons for Marketing Measurement
Long-run argument that “the lion’s share of spending is on customers who seem to be well aware of the site”§6 p. 22Discussion note (the published text keeps only the brand-keyword version of the argument)
Google AdWords ROI advice quote and critique (fn. 33)§6 p. 23Discussion note
Scholars use natural or controlled experiments; consulting firms use observational data§6 p. 23Discussion note
CLV needed to offset −63% short-run ROI (fn. 34)§6 p. 24Discussion note; ROI note
”The idealized experiment would have been conducted on a more refined user-level randomization”, with Anderson & Simester (2010) (fn. 35)§6 p. 24Discussion note

Numbers checked as identical

99.5% / 0.529% / Table 1 brand coefficients. Table 2 (0.00659, 0.00578, −0.0460, 0.150, −0.0141, −0.0119). Table 3 (0.885, 0.126, 0.00401, 0.00188; N 10,500 / 23,730). Table 4 ROIs (4173%, 1632%, −22%, −63%, −63%) and bounds. Inputs $2,880.64M and $51M. 72% attributed-sales fall; 30% size gap; 68/65/77 DMAs; 133 candidates. Fig. 4-5 axes; the 0.02 pp/month recency spline (s.e. .00004577). 41% / 2% / 42% click figures; 0.5 / 0.23 visit elasticities. 38 and 378 categories. Germany Table 5 / A.III, including the sentence “Narrowing the window and controlling for state trends reduces the magnitude” (see ^note-table5-monotonicity). Candidacy Tables 6-7 / A.IV-A.V. Levels 0.199 / −80%.

One residual inconsistency fixed in the published version

The WP’s Discussion twice refers to “Table 5” for the inflated OLS ROIs, which are actually in Tables 3-4 (Table 5 is the German brand test). The accepted manuscript refers to Table 1, the merged ROI table, which is correct.

Examples

Citing a number correctly

To cite the −63% ROI and its interval, cite Blake, Nosko & Tadelis (2015, Econometrica, Table 1, col. 4-5). To cite the 0.00659 DiD coefficient with its specification variants, cite the online supplement, Table A.II. To quote Google’s AdWords ROI advice as critiqued by the authors, cite the NBER working paper (w20171, §6, p. 23), because the journal version omits it.

Connections

See Also